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I.  Introduction 
 
Persistently high unemployment rates in several European countries and relatively low 
wage levels among less skilled workers in the United States have led researchers and 
policymakers to seek policies to alleviate these twin labor market problems.  Perhaps the key 
issue countries face in designing labor market policy is to determine the appropriate degree of 
labor market flexibility in wage setting, labor utilization (hiring, retention and assignment 
decisions by firms), and labor mobility.  At one extreme stand the Scandinavian countries with 
very high levels of union coverage and extensive government intervention in the labor market.  
At the other extreme are English-speaking countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States with low levels of union coverage and far less extensive welfare state 
protections and other labor market regulation systems.  In this paper, I explore reasons for such 
differences and then provide a comparative analysis of the impact of labor market policy on 
outcomes such as unemployment, wage inequality, gender pay gaps, employment security and 
productivity.  I will focus primarily on OECD countries with some additional discussion of 
specific policies in Latin America.   
  The paper will first provide comparative information on several dimensions of flexibility, 
including wage setting institutions (collective bargaining and minimum wage laws), employment 
protection mandates (e.g. mandated severance pay or restrictions on the use of temporary 
employment contracts), unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels and duration,  active labor 
market policy programs (ALMPs--e.g. public employment or training programs), and parental 
leave mandates.
1  The next portion of the paper will discuss economic theory on the reasons why 
countries differ in their policy regimes and the expected impact of these labor market policies on 
outcomes such as wage inequality, unemployment, and the incidence of temporary employment.  
This discussion will emphasize the potential benefits of labor market policies in solving market 
                                                            
1  While collective bargaining is not a government program, it interacts with labor market policies in ways I will 
discuss in detail.  Moreover, government policy can have a direct impact on the level and type of collective 
bargaining coverage through mandated representation procedures as well as government policies extending 
collective bargaining agreements to nonunion workers.   2
failures that an unregulated labor market may produce, such as an incomplete market in income 
insurance.  On economic theory and expected effects of labor market policies, an important 
theme is the interaction between wage rigidity (i.e. a lack of responsiveness of wages to market 
forces) and labor market policies such as mandated employer-paid benefits (including 
employment protection or employer-paid fringe benefits), as well as potential interactions 
between the policies themselves.   
  The next section will provide some descriptive information on labor market performance 
among some major OECD countries including relative unemployment by groups (e.g., gender or 
nativity), the incidence of temporary employment contracts, wage inequality overall, and the 
gender pay gap.  The paper will then present evidence on the impact of labor market policies on 
these outcomes.  I will discuss some methodological issues in assessing these effects, including 
the need to take into account population heterogeneity, the likely interaction between policies, 
and the endogeneity of policy decisions.  Finding appropriate research designs to allow one to 
make causal statements is the central research issue facing those who wish to evaluate labor 
market policies, and I will provide examples of such designs. 
  The paper then summarizes evidence on the impact of several important labor market 
policies and institutions on unemployment, relative wages, the gender pay gap, the incidence of 
temporary employment, and productivity.  I specifically consider evidence on wage-setting 
institutions such as collective bargaining and minimum wages, as well as unemployment 
insurance (UI), employment protection mandates, parental leave, and active labor market policy 
(ALMP).  Some of the most convincing research designs in this area involve instances where one 
country has enacted a reform (e.g. of its UI or employment protection systems) affecting 
particular subgroups of the population such as older workers.  These instances help provide 
researchers with appropriate control groups and may address the endogeneity problem just 
mentioned, and such analyses are at the forefront of empirical economic research on the impact 
of labor market policy. 
   3
II.  International Differences in Wage-Setting Institutions and Labor Market Policies 
 
  Tables 1-3 provide some descriptive information on the dramatically different labor 
market institutions and policies across some major OECD countries.  The countries chosen can 
be grouped as Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), Central European 
(France, Germany, Italy and Spain), and English-speaking (Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States).  Scandinavian countries stand out as having chosen very extensive 
interventions in their labor markets, while the English-speaking countries have the least 
intervention and are the most flexible along the dimensions mentioned earlier.  The Central 
European countries resemble Scandinavia more than the English-speaking countries; moreover, 
the four listed have relatively large populations and thus represent an important share of 
Europeans.
2 
  Table 1 provides information on collective bargaining institutions.  The Scandinavian 
countries exhibit high levels of both union membership and collective bargaining coverage; 
moreover, wage setting is relatively coordinated in these countries as well, with many 
agreements fashioned at the sectoral level or even higher.  Government policy can influence 
coordination through policies on wage negotiations as occurred in Norway’s recentralization in 
the late 1980s (Kahn 1998).  Union density in Scandinavia ranges from 54% to 79%, while 
coverage goes from a minimum of over 70% to over 90%.  The Central European countries have 
much lower union membership levels (10-35%) but similar coverage rates by collective 
bargaining to Scandinavian levels.  This difference between membership and coverage is due in 
an accounting sense to government policies in all four of these countries to extend the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements to nonunion workers (OECD 2004, p. 148).  The prevalence of 
such policies in fifteen OECD countries represents a potentially important impact of labor 
                                                            
2  For example, France, Germany, Italy and Spain comprise 78% of the population of the EU-15 countries (see the 
Eurostat website:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnot






Table 1:  Trade Union Density, Collective Bargaining Coverage, and Coordination Index, Selected 
Countries, 2000
Country Union Density (%) Collective Bargaining Coverage (%)
Coordination Index (1995-
2000: 1=low, 5=high)
Denmark 74 80+ 4
Finland 76 90+ 5
Norway 54 70+ 4.5
Sweden 79 90+ 3
France 10 90+ 2
Germany 25 68 4
Italy 35 80+ 4
Spain 15 80+ 3
Canada 28 32 1
United Kingdom 31 30+ 1
United States 13 14 1
Source:  OECD (2004), pp. 145, 151.    Union density is the percentage of wage and salary
workers who are union members.  Coverage is the fraction of wage and salary workers
covered by collective bargaining.5 
 
market policy.
3  Wage setting is relatively coordinated in the Central European countries, 
particularly in Italy and Germany.  Finally, the English-speaking countries have low levels of 
membership and coverage, and very decentralized wage setting.  The United States stands out 
with the lowest levels of coverage at 14%.  Thus, on wage-setting institutions, the English-
speaking countries allow much more flexibility than those in Continental Europe. 
  A major labor market policy is mandated employment protection.  This concept 
encompasses a variety of rules including mandated severance pay in the event a firm fires a 
worker, administrative procedures including the requirement to negotiate over reductions in 
force, mandatory notice periods before layoffs, and limitations on the use of temporary 
employment contracts (OECD 2004, pp. 61-125).  The OECD has aggregated these provisions 
into indexes of protection on regular jobs (based on policies such as mandatory severance pay) 
and temporary employment (comprising regulations such as the maximum number and duration 
of such contracts), and Table 2 summarizes these indexes for the 11 countries shown in Table 1.  
Overall, the Scandinavian and Central European countries have far more extensive protections 
on regular jobs and more restrictions on the use of temporary contracts than the English-speaking 
countries do.  Sweden, Spain and Germany have particularly strong protections on regular jobs, 
while France and Spain have the strictest rules on temporary contracts.  Among the Continental 
European countries, Denmark stands out as having the weakest protections, a theme I will 
discuss later, although even Denmark’s regulations are stricter than those in the English-speaking 
countries.  Denmark’s system of employment regulation has been dubbed a “flexicurity” policy, 
in which firms have flexibility to fire workers, and workers have income security through the UI 
system (Anderson and Svarer 2007).  As was the case with wage setting, the English speaking 
countries allow firms the most freedom, in this instance the freedom to fire workers from regular 
jobs and to use temporary employment contracts.  The US again stands out as having the least 
regulation of its labor market with respect to employment protection. 
                                                            
3  In addition to France, Germany, Italy and Spain, the government can extend the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements to nonunion workers in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, 





Table 2:  Employment Protection Regulation Strictness, 2003 
(0=no regulation up to 6)










United Kingdom 1.1 0.4
United States 0.2 0.3
Source:  OECD (2004), p. 117.7 
 
  Table 3 provides information on several other important elements of labor market policy.  
The pattern of greater intervention in Continental Europe, particularly Scandinavia, than in the 
English-speaking countries continues.  Specifically, UI benefit levels and potential duration are 
far more generous in Scandinavia and France than elsewhere, and with the exception of Italy, are 
weakest in the English-speaking countries.  Denmark stands out as having a high replacement 
rate and the longest potential duration, the “security” portion of its flexicurity policy.  Of the 
countries with statutory minimum wages, France has the highest relative level, although in 
several countries without statutory minima, unions negotiate sectoral minimum wages (for 
example in Scandinavia and Germany).  Continental European countries spend much higher 
portions of their GDP on ALMPs than the English-speaking countries do, particularly Denmark 
and Sweden.  These policies include training programs, employment subsidies, and direct job 
creation through public employment and represent an important aspect of labor market policy 
(OECD 2010, pp. 298-304).  Finally, overall, Continental European countries mandate relatively 
high levels of paid parental leave, particularly Norway, Sweden and Germany, although 
Canada’s level is higher than several European country levels.  Parental leave can be seen as a 
labor market policy in that it provides incentives to leave the labor force during child rearing but 
also allows one to maintain ties to the firm on returning to work.
4 
 
III.  Economic Theory on Reasons for and Effects of Labor Market Policies 
  Several of the policies and institutions described in Tables 1-3 provide some form of 
income insurance.  Specifically, as discussed further below, centralized collective bargaining 
agreements reduce wage differentials, lowering employed workers’ uncertainty over earnings 
both over time and also across workers at a point in time (Agell and Lommerud 1992); 
moreover, employment protection directly insures workers’ jobs, UI is explicitly an insurance 
program, and ALMPs and parental leave also provide insurance against economic fluctuations 
                                                            
4  Although the US doesn’t require any paid parental leave, its 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act provides a 
mandated twelve weeks of unpaid leave, a policy designed to allow workers to maintain ties with their firm (Blau, 






Table 3:  Further Labor Market Policy Characteristics--Unemployment Insurance (UI), Minimum Wages, and 




















of Paid Parental 
Leave, Couples 
(2008)
Denmark 70 48 1.35 19.6
Finland 70 23 0.82 33.0
Norway 68 36 0.56 44.0
Sweden 75 28 0.99 46.8
France 75 30 0.54 0.81 23.4
Germany 69 12 0.81 42.0
Italy 54 6 0.45 25.1
Spain 67 21 0.29 0.73 26.7
Canada 63 9 0.41 0.30 28.6
United Kingdom 54 6 0.44 0.32 12.4
United States 54 6 0.31 0.17 0.0
Sources:  OECD (2006, pp. 60, 87), www.ssa.gov (for Denmark’s UI benefit duration), OECD (2010, pp. 298-304),
and Ray, Gornick and Schmitt (2008, p. 13).  ALMP data refer to 2008-9 for Canada and the United States,
2007-8 for the United Kingdom, and 2007 for Norway.9 
 
and family-related disruptions of work.  Because of problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, private, unregulated markets are not likely to provide economically efficient levels of 
income insurance.
5  Thus, there is likely to be an efficiency role for public policy in this area, in 
the sense that the government can provide a product that people desire and are willing to pay for 
but that the private sector will not supply.  Of course, even if there were no efficiency gains 
caused by government policy in these areas, political coalitions such as currently employed 
workers might push for protections that benefit them, perhaps to others’ detriment (Brügemann 
2007). 
  While insurance motives may help explain why governments enact certain labor market 
policies, what explains the differences in regulatory systems we see in Tables 1-3 such as the 
relatively heavy reliance on such interventionist policies in Scandinavia and light regulation in 
the English-speaking countries?  A detailed analysis of this topic would take us into areas of 
political economy that are beyond the scope of this paper.  However several hypotheses have 
emerged from economists and political scientists that help explain the variety of policy outcomes 
we see in Tables 1-3.  First, according to Rodrik (1998), one of the major motivations for public 
services (such as active labor market policies) is to provide social insurance that the private 
market is unwilling or unable to provide.  He hypothesizes and finds that countries that are most 
susceptible to external risk (caused by exogenous factors leading to openness to international 
trade) will, other things equal, have larger public sectors.  Similar ideas can be found in the 
political science literature as well (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985).  Second, ethnic 
homogeneity may lead to national consensus in providing public goods such as those supplied by 
social insurance programs (Alesina and Glaeser 2004), and Scandinavia may fit this bill better 
                                                            
5  Adverse selection occurs when people with the highest risks of needing insurance disproportionately decide to buy 
it, and moral hazard occurs when insurance causes people to behave in ways that increase their use of insurance.  An 
example of the former could be when workers anticipating layoff decide to buy a hypothetical income insurance 
policy, while an example of moral hazard could be when the presence of unemployment insurance causes workers to 
stay unemployed longer.  These two phenomena are likely major reasons why the private sector does not offer much 
in the way of income insurance.  In addition, since unemployment often affects a whole country, a private insurance 
company might not be able to pool income risks and therefore would be unlikely to offer income insurance.  For 
further discussion of the issues, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).   10 
than the US, the UK or Canada.  A related hypothesis comes from Summers, Vergara and Gruber 
(1993) who suggest that countries with very centralized and strong labor movements may be 
better able to follow a high tax, high social benefit policy because the major decision makers, 
centralized trade unions, can internalize the possible disincentive effects of high taxes by 
controlling labor supply.  While each of these explanations may have some merit, this is an area 
of ongoing research as investigators seek to explain why labor market policies differ across 
countries. 
  On the effects of labor market policies, a basic prediction from microeconomics is that 
union wage setting will lower employment if labor markets would otherwise be competitive and 
if firms are allowed to hire as much or as little labor as they want (the so-called “right to manage 
model”).
6  Moreover, if unions reduce the responsiveness of wages to economic conditions, then 
demand shocks to the economy will lead to larger aggregate employment fluctuations in 
unionized than in nonunion labor markets (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).  To some degree these 
adverse macroeconomic effects can be alleviated under highly coordinated bargaining, as 
centralized unions may be able to anticipate the macroeconomic effects of their wage bargains in 
ways that decentralized unions may not; this phenomenon may have helped explain low 
unemployment in some of the highly unionized Scandinavian countries (Calmfors and Driffill 
1988; Nickell and Layard 1999). 
  As discussed by Bertola (1992), the overall employment effects of employment 
protection mandates are theoretically ambiguous, since such laws deter both job destruction (by 
inducing firms to keep workers they would otherwise fire) and job creation (as firms anticipate 
that they might have to fire newly hired workers some time in the future).  But the negative 
effects on employment are most likely to be felt by new entrants, while the positive effects are 
felt by incumbents.  We therefore predict that employment protection will lower the relative 
                                                            
6  This prediction becomes less firm if labor and management jointly set wages and employment or if firms have 
monopsony power in the labor market.  For discussion of these issues, see Farber (1986) and Manning (2003).   11 
employment levels of the less experienced, including youth, women and immigrants (Kahn 
2007). 
  An important insight on the economics of employment protection comes from the work 
of Lazear (1990) who suggests that if wages are flexible, then mandating employment protection 
in the form of severance pay to workers should lead to lower wages, as the demand for labor 
shifts down.  If so, then employment protection need not lead to higher overall labor costs to 
firms and thus not to a lower overall demand for labor.  This reasoning is an example of the more 
general phenomenon of mandated employer-provided benefits such as health care, family leave, 
or pensions.  Specifically, if the government requires firms to pay for such benefits and if 
workers value them by as much as they cost, then both the supply and demand curves for labor 
will shift down equally, leaving employment unchanged if wages are flexible (Summers 1989). 
  The foregoing analysis implies that wage rigidity and mandated benefits will have 
interaction effects.  If, for example, unions have reduced or eliminated the effect of market forces 
on wages, then mandated benefits will have more negative employment effects than otherwise 
(in the same manner as in Blanchard and Wolfers’ (2000) discussion of macroeconomic shocks, 
mentioned earlier).  Unions have been shown to compress wages, particularly at the bottom of 
the wage distribution, through standard rate policies and coordinated wage policies in highly 
unionized countries such as those in Scandinavia (Freeman 1982; Blau and Kahn 1996; 
Wallerstein 1999; Edin and Topel 1997; Koeniger, Leonardi and Nunziata 2007).  Thus, 
mandated benefits will lower the relative employment of low wage workers by more in countries 
with highly centralized, compressed wage structures than in nations with more wage inequality.  
Moreover, my earlier discussion of new entrants vs. incumbents and employment protection 
implies that protection will raise the employment gap by more the more compressed the wage 
structure is.  Thus, we predict that mandated benefits such as employment protection will tend 
reduce the ability of low wage workers and new entrants to obtain high-paying, protected jobs by 
more when the wage structure is highly compressed (Kahn 2007). 
   12 
IV.  Labor Market Performance in Selected OECD Countries 
 
  Tables 4-7 provide some descriptive information on labor market performance across the 
eleven countries studied in Tables 1-3.  Table 4 shows various measures of labor utilization, 
including employment to population ratios, part time employment incidence and unemployment 
rates.  Looking first at overall employment, Denmark and Norway have relatively high levels of 
male and female employment, while they are low in Spain and Italy.  Differences across 
countries in employment are larger for older and younger individuals than for those of prime age 
(ages 25-54).  For example, France, Spain and Italy have especially low levels of employment 
among both youth and older men and women, and older and younger men have especially low 
employment to population ratios in Finland.  Among employed women, part-time jobs are 
especially prevalent in Germany, Italy, the UK, and Norway but much less so in Finland, 
Sweden and the United States.  While part-time work is of course much less prevalent for men, 
Denmark has a relatively high incidence of male part time employment, and part-time work is 
particularly rare among Italian and Spanish men. 
Table 4 also shows unemployment rates for 2009 by age and gender, which have risen 
sharply during the recession of 2008-9.  For example, across the OECD, unemployment rose 
from 5.6% in late 2007 to 8.5% in the first quarter of 2010 (OECD 2010, p. 19).  Table 4 shows 
that overall unemployment for the full age range (15-64 years) is very high in Spain for both men 
and women (17.8-18.5%), while it is very low in Norway (2.7-3.7%), with Denmark having the 
next lowest unemployment at 5.4-6.7%.
7   Moreover, youth unemployment is higher than adult 
unemployment in each country, with especially high levels in Spain, France, Sweden, Finland 
and Italy, and low levels in Denmark, Germany and Norway.  The English-speaking countries 
have intermediate levels of youth unemployment.
                                                            
7  Unemployment has risen especially sharply in Spain and the United States, which had severe real estate crises 
(OECD 2010, p. 17).  For example, between 2007 and 2009, overall unemployment rose from 8.5 to 18.0% in Spain 




Table 4:  Labor Utilization, 2009
A. Employment-Population Ratio (%) B.  Fraction Part Time (%)
Men Women
Age 15-64 Age 15-24 Age 25-54 Age 55-64 Age 15-64 Age 15-24 Age 25-54 Age 55-64 Men  Women 
Denmark 78.3 63.6 87.2 64.1 73.1 63.7 82.9 50.9 13.6 24.8
Finland 68.9 35.6 84.4 54.7 67.9 41.6 80.4 56.5 8.7 15.9
Norway 78.4 52.0 88.3 72.8 74.4 54.4 83.5 64.6 11.3 30.4
Sweden 74.1 37.3 86.9 73.3 70.2 38.8 81.9 66.8 10.0 19.8
France 68.0 32.1 87.6 41.4 59.8 28.1 76.8 36.7 5.1 22.4
Germany 75.5 48.6 86.1 63.8 65.2 44.4 75.4 48.6 8.0 38.1
Italy 68.6 26.1 84.7 46.7 46.4 17.0 59.1 25.4 5.9 30.5
Spain 67.5 32.4 77.3 56.7 53.5 29.1 63.8 32.3 4.4 21.4
Canada 74.0 53.6 83.5 62.3 69.1 57.1 77.2 53.1 11.9 27.0
United Kingdom 75.7 52.8 85.4 66.1 65.6 51.4 74.4 49.3 10.9 38.8
United States 72.0 46.7 81.5 65.2 63.4 47.0 70.2 56.4 9.2 19.2
C.  Harmonized Unemployment Rate
Men Women
Age 15-64 Age 15-24 Age 25-54 Age 55-64 Age 15-64 Age 15-24 Age 25-54 Age 55-64
Denmark 6.7 12.4 5.7 5.3 5.4 9.9 4.7 3.9
Finland 9.1 24.5 7.1 7.1 7.6 18.8 6.1 5.5
Norway 3.7 10.3 2.9 1.5 2.7 8.0 2.0 0.6
Sweden 8.8 26.3 6.4 5.8 8.1 23.7 6.0 4.6
France 8.9 23.1 7.2 6.5 9.3 21.5 8.2 6.0
Germany 8.2 12.0 7.6 8.0 7.4 9.8 6.9 8.0
Italy 6.9 23.3 5.9 3.7 9.3 28.7 8.5 2.8
Spain 17.8 39.1 16.2 11.3 18.5 36.4 16.9 13.3
Canada 9.6 18.0 8.0 8.0 7.1 12.4 6.1 5.7
United Kingdom 8.9 21.7 6.8 6.0 6.5 15.6 5.2 2.8
United States 10.5 20.1 9.2 7.2 8.2 14.9 7.2 6.0
Source:  OECD (2010), pp. 272-3, 277-82, and 286.   Part time work is defined as a work week of less than 30 hours and
is expressed as a percentage of employment.14 
 
The 2008-9 recession has raised male unemployment by more than female 
unemployment.  For example, in our sample of 11 countries, between 2007 and 2009, male 
unemployment rose by an unweighted average of 3.3 percentage points (from 5.7 to 9.0), while 
women’s unemployment rose by only 1.7 percentage points (from 6.5 to 8.2); thus, overall, the 
gender gap in unemployment reversed between these two years, moving from a female excess of 
0.8 percentage points to a male excess of 0.8 percentage points.
8  In Scandinavia, men’s 
unemployment was 0.5 percentage points less than women’s in 2007, while it was 1.1 percentage 
points higher than women’s by 2009; in the Central European countries in Table 4, male 
unemployment was 2.2 percentage points lower than women’s in 2007; however, the excess 
female unemployment there had shrunk to 0.7 percentage points by 2009.  And in the English 
speaking countries, women actually had lower unemployment than men in 2007 with a margin of 
0.5 percentage points; by 2009, men’s excess unemployment in these nations had risen to 2.4 
percentage points.  Thus, in both years, women had lower relative unemployment in the English-
speaking countries than in Continental Europe. 
  Table 5 compares unemployment rates by immigrant status and gender for 2007, the most 
recent year for which such a breakdown can be constructed.  In the Continental European 
countries, unemployment is always higher for immigrants than natives, with especially large 
gaps in all of the Scandinavian countries and in France and Germany.  For example, among these 
six countries, the gap for men ranges from 4.7 (France) to 7.2 (Germany) percentage points, 
while for women, immigrant unemployment is higher than the level for natives by 4.1 (Denmark) 
to 10.5 (Finland) percentage points.  These are very large differentials and suggest that 
immigrants have considerably more difficulty finding work than natives do in these countries, 
even when as in the cases of Denmark and Norway, the overall unemployment rate is relatively 
low.  The English-speaking countries are notable in that immigrant unemployment is usually 
similar to native unemployment, with the exception of immigrant women in the UK, whose 
unemployment is 4.1 percentage points above natives’.  But for Canada, the US and British men, 
                                                            




Table 5:  Harmonized Unemployment Rates by Immigrant Status and Gender, 2007
Country Native Born Men Foreign-Born Men Native-Born Women Foreign-Born Women
Denmark 3.0 8.6 3.8 7.9
Finland 6.5 12.0 6.9 17.4
Norway 3.1 8.9 3.0 7.7
Sweden 5.1 11.7 5.5 12.6
France 7.2 11.9 7.6 15.1
Germany 7.7 14.9 8.0 13.5
Italy 4.9 5.3 7.6 11.4
Spain 6.0 8.3 10.5 12.6
Canada 6.7 6.1 6.2 7.9
United Kingdom 5.4 6.9 4.4 8.5
United States 5.4 4.8 4.3 4.0
Source:  Country Notes to OECD, Immigration Outlook 2009:
http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_2649_33931_44060528_1_1_1_1,00.html
Data for Canada and Norway refer to 2006.16 
 
immigrant unemployment is far less different from natives’ level than it is in the other European 
countries.  In fact, for Canadian men and both men and women in the US, immigrant 
unemployment is actually slightly lower than native levels.  Notably, although native 
unemployment is higher in the US than in Denmark or Norway, the rate for immigrant men and 
women is considerably higher in the latter two countries. 
  While lower unemployment rates typically mean a more successful level of labor market 
performance, not all jobs are equally valuable.  As discussed further below, one of the most 
common labor market policies pursued by European countries seeking to fight high 
unemployment levels without threatening the protections illustrated in Tables 1-3 is to allow 
firms greater freedom to create temporary jobs.  Such jobs are known to pay less, offer less 
training, and be less satisfying than regular jobs (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002; Kahn 
2007).  On the other hand, it is possible that such jobs may be stepping stones to regular 
employment, although evidence on this issue is mixed (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002; 
Autor and Houseman forthcoming; and Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 2005).  Table 6 shows the 
incidence of temporary employment by gender and age for 2000, and the overall incidence, plus 
that for women, youth and those age 25-54 in 2009.  The overall incidence of temporary 
employment in both years is much higher in Spain than elsewhere; moreover, it is also high in 
Finland, Sweden, France and Germany and low in the UK and the US in both years.   
  Women have higher levels of temporary employment than men in each case except for 
the US in 2009, where the average and the female rates are the same.
9  The gender gap in 2000 
was usually lower in the English-speaking countries (with women having an incidence 0.3 to 1.8 
percentage points higher than men’s) than in the Continental European countries (0.6 to 6.4 
percentage points), and, similarly, in 2009, the difference between women’s rate and the overall 
rate of temporary jobs was smaller in the English speaking countries (0.0 to 0.4 percentage 
points) than in Continental Europe (0.1 to 3.9 percentage points).  The 2009 comparison between 
the Total and Women in Table 6 of course doesn’t control for the relative size of female 
                                                            




Table 6:  Incidence of Temporary Employment, 2000 and 2009 (% of dependent 
employment)
A.  2000
Country Men Women Age 15-24 Age 25-54 Age 55+
Denmark 8.8 11.7 30.6 6.5 5.1
Finland 14.5 20.9 49.5 14.3 5.1
Norway 7.8 11.8 33.6 8.6 5.2
Sweden 12.3 16.9 41.3 10.5 7.5
France 14.3 15.7 34.8 6.6 3.0
Germany 12.5 13.1 38.9 6.1 3.8
Italy 8.8 12.2 14.7 5.4 5.5
Spain 30.6 34.6 67.4 25.2 11.8
Canada 11.8 13.3 29.5 8.8 10.5
United Kingdom 5.9 7.7 12.0 4.9 5.8
United States 3.9 4.2 8.1 3.2 3.8
B.  2009
Country Total Women Age 15-24 Age 25-54
Denmark 8.9 9.6 23.6 6.5
Finland 14.6 18.4 39.0 12.4
Norway 9.2 13.1 32.4 6.8
Sweden 15.3 17.6 53.4 11.1
France 13.5 15.0 51.2 9.7
Germany 14.5 14.6 57.2 9.3
Italy 12.5 14.6 44.4 10.7
Spain 25.4 27.3 55.9 24.2
Canada 12.5 12.9 27.8 9.2
United Kingdom 5.7 6.1 11.9 4.3
United States 4.2 4.2 8.1 3.5
Sources:  OECD (2002, p. 138); OECD (2010, pp. 289-90).  Data refer to 1997 




Table 7:  Wage Inequality and the Gender Pay Gap, 2008
Country 90:50 Wage Ratio 50:10 Wage Ratio Female/Male Pay Ratio
Denmark 1.74 1.57 0.88
Finland 1.76 1.46 0.79
Norway 1.46 1.56 0.91
Sweden 1.66 1.37 0.85
France 1.98 1.47 0.88
Germany 1.72 1.93 0.75
Italy 1.74 1.55 0.94
Spain 1.98 1.66 0.88
Canada 1.88 2.00 0.80
United Kingdom 1.98 1.83 0.79
United States 2.34 2.09 0.80
Sources:  OECD (2010), p. 295, and unpublished tabulations from the OECD  for the Italian gender  
pay gap, kindly supplied by Pascal Marianna.  Data for France are from 2007.  Wages are defined
as gross earnings of full-time wage and salary workers.  The gender pay gap is defined as the
ratio of median earnings of women divided by median earnings of men, except for Italy,
where the gender pay gap is defined as the ratio of female to male median hourly earnings
for workers who usually work at least 30 hours per week.19 
 
employment in affecting the total, while in 2000, the OECD’s figures allow a sharper gender 
comparison.  Nonetheless, the overall conclusion on gender and temporary employment is 
similar for 2009 as for 2000:  in the English speaking countries, the gender gap in the incidence 
of permanent employment is lower than in Continental Europe.  
  Young people everywhere are more likely to be in temporary jobs, with especially high 
levels in Spain, Finland, France, Sweden and Germany, and low levels in the UK and the US.  
Thus, overall, temporary employment seems lower in the countries with fewer restrictions on 
their labor markets, and new entrants do relatively better in finding permanent jobs in these 
countries as well.  Of course, the permanence of permanent jobs may be less evident in the 
English-speaking countries as well, due to lower mandated levels of employment protection.  
Thus, age and gender gaps in mandated employment security are likely to be lower in the 
English-speaking countries both because young workers and women have a higher relative 
incidence of permanent employment there and because permanent employment provides less 
mandated protection there than in Continental Europe. 
  Table 7 shows data on wage inequality and the gender pay gap.  Pay inequality between 
the high end (90
th percentile) and the middle (50
th percentile) is especially high in the US, Spain, 
France, the UK and Canada, while it is relatively low in Sweden and Norway.  The bottom is less 
compressed (i.e. the 50-10 gap) in the US, Canada, Germany and the UK, while it is especially 
tightly compressed in Scandinavia, France and Italy.  Finally, the gender pay gap is especially 
low in France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Denmark, and is highest in Germany.  But overall, the 
differences in the gender pay gap across countries are not nearly as large as the differences in the 
50-10 or 90-50 pay gaps.  Specifically, the ratio of female to male full time earnings ranges from 
0.75 (Germany) to 0.94 (Italy), while the 50-10 and 90-50 ratios range from 1.37-2.09 (50-10) 
and from 1.46-2.34 (90-50).
10  I note that in the 1980s, there were far larger international 
                                                            
10  The OECD Employment Outlook for 2010 reports an Italian gender pay of only 1% (p. 295), when people self-
report their full-time status rather than their actual work hours.  This figure is somewhat smaller than recent research 
on the gender pay gap in Italy has found.  For example, several authors have reported gender pay gaps for Italy 
ranging from 4% to 6% over the 1995-2005 period such as:  Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), p. 632; Arulampalam, 
Booth and Bryan (2007), p. 166; Picchio and Mussida (2010), p. 13; and OECD (2008), p. 146.  Unpublished   20 
differences in the gender pay gap, and these have converged considerably (Blau and Kahn 1992; 
2008).  Overall, Table 7 shows that gender pay gap in the English speaking countries tends to be 
on the high side (the gap is 20-21 percentage points) compared to the Continental European 
countries (where the gap is 6-25 percentage points). 
  Considering Tables 1-7 overall, it appears that the English-speaking countries have more 
flexible labor markets, as well as lower relative female and usually immigrant relative 
unemployment as well, lower incidence of temporary employment overall and among women 
and youth, and higher levels of wage inequality.  While it is tempting to conclude that these 
differences in regulatory rules and institutions caused the differences in outcomes, we need to 
consider other possible causes of labor market outcomes; in addition, one must determine 
whether, after accounting for other factors, any remaining association between policies and 
outcomes is causal.  The next section explores such issues and summarizes research findings on 
the impact of labor market policy on employment and wage outcomes. 
 
V.  The Impact of Labor Market Policy on Labor Market Performance 
 
  In order to detect the influence of policies on labor market outcomes researchers have had 
to confront several issues that prevent one from making conclusions based on simple cross-
sectional comparisons of the policies shown in Tables 1-3 and the outcomes depicted in Tables 
4-7.  First, some countries have a more diverse population with respect to their skills and 
ethnicity than others, although educational and immigration policies can affect such diversity.  
For example, it is possible that diversity of skills helps explain the higher US levels of wage 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tabulations from the OECD, kindly supplied by Pascal Marianna, show a 6% gap when full-time work is defined as 
usually working at least 30 hours per week.  I use this estimate, which is still quite small by international standards.  
Earlier research also found a lower Italian gender pay gap than in most other Western countries (Blau and Kahn 
2003).  This low gap may be partially explained by Italian’s relatively low employment rate (see Table 4 above), 
either through selection effects (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008; Picchio and Mussida 2010) or a possible combination 
of selection effects and the impact of low female supply on female relative wages (Blau and Kahn 2003).  Of course, 
to the extent that the low gender pay gap in Italy is caused by wage compression due to collective bargaining, some 
of women’s low employment level in Italy may be a demand response by Italian employers.   21 
inequality shown in Table 7 (Blau and Kahn 2005).  Second, Tables 1-3 show that some policies 
occur as a group.  For example, the Scandinavia countries have high levels of collective 
bargaining coverage, strict employment protection and generous UI systems.  It may be difficult 
to disentangle the influence of any one policy.  Moreover, some policies may interact, as in the 
case of wage floors (fostered, for example, in France, Germany, Italy and Spain by government 
extension of collective bargaining agreements to nonunion workers) and employment protection 
mandates discussed earlier.  Thus, the impact of employment protection is likely to be different 
in different countries.  Third, some policies are enacted in response to employment problems.  
For example, it is likely that high unemployment in the 1990s induced a number of countries to 
ease restrictions on firms’ right to create temporary jobs, in an attempt to increase job creation 
(Kahn 2010).  One might therefore observe a positive correlation between unemployment rates 
and such reforms that doesn’t reflect the reforms’ true impact.   
To deal with these research issues, several of the most successful studies of the impact of 
policy use data on individuals (allowing one to control for population heterogeneity).  In 
addition, in some instances, there have been dramatic shifts affecting only one policy, allowing 
one to focus on a particular law.  Moreover, policies have sometimes been enacted that affect 
subgroups differently, allowing one to form appropriate control groups in evaluating the impact 
of policies.  These will be discussed below.  The following review of evidence focuses on the 
impact of major labor policies in the areas of minimum wages and union wage-setting, 
employment protection, parental leave mandates, active labor market policies, and UI. 
 
A.   Wage Setting Institutions 
Research on union wage setting and minimum wages robustly finds that these labor 
market institutions compress wages, particularly at the bottom of the pay distribution.  These 
findings are obtained using aggregate data (e.g. Wallerstein 1999; Koeniger, Leonardi and 
Nunziata 2007) as well as individual-level data (Blau and Kahn 1996 and 2005; Dolado et. al 
1996; Card and Krueger 1995; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996).  Moreover, several studies   22 
of changes in collective bargaining institutions within a single country find that increased 
centralization lowers wage inequality, including the cases of Sweden’s solidarity wage policy of 
1968-74 (Edin and Topel 1997; Davis and Henrekson 2005), Norway’s bargaining 
recentralization of 1988 (Kahn 1998), Italy’s wage indexation policy of 1975-92 (Erickson and 
Ichino 1995; Manacorda 2004); and New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act of 1991, which 
greatly decentralized wage-setting there (Dixon 1998).  However, research findings on the 
employment effects of such interventions are mixed.  In some cases, the wage compression is 
seen to lower less skilled workers’ relative employment, including the cases of Sweden and 
Norway just mentioned, as well as minimum wages and the employment of low-skill workers in 
France (Abowd et. al 2000) and Colombia (Bell 1995).  In addition, unionized wage setting 
across the OECD has been found to lower the relative employment of women and youth, other 
things equal (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2007).  Some other studies, however, find that wage 
compression does not lower the relative employment of the less-skilled, including the cases of 
union wage setting in Canada, France, and Germany (see Card, Kramarz and Lemieux 1999 for a 
comparison of these three countries and Krueger and Pischke 1998 for a US-Germany 
comparison), and minimum wages in the US and the UK (Card and Krueger 1995; Machin and 
Manning 1994).  In some cases, public employment has been credited with reducing the 
disemployment effects of wage compression (Edin and Topel 1997; Bjorklund and Freeman 
1997; Kahn 1998; Blau and Kahn 2000; and Kahn 2008).  In others, authors have found evidence 
suggesting that unions or minimum wages may act to counter employer market power and not 
lead to lower employment, as would have been expected under competitive labor markets (Card 
and Krueger 1995; Manning 2003). 
   
B.   Employment Protection Mandates 
 
Employment protection is a major issue in labor market policy in Europe.  Research on 
the effects of such mandates has examined both macroeconomic and individual worker and firm   23 
outcomes.  At the macro level, Nickell and Layard (1999) found that in the 1980s and 1990s, 
strictness of protection on regular jobs across OECD countries was not correlated with overall 
unemployment rates, although as mentioned below, there is some evidence that employment 
protection has lowered employment in the US.  There was, however, a positive association with 
long term unemployment that was counterbalanced by a negative association with short term 
unemployment.  These offsetting results likely reflect the idea that protection deters both job 
creation (leading to a longer duration of unemployment for those looking for work) and job 
destruction (leading to fewer short term layoffs).  Also at the macro level, Booth, Dolado and 
Frank (2002) found a positive association across OECD countries between the strictness of 
employment protection mandates and the incidence of temporary employment.  The creation of 
temporary jobs is a predictable response by firms to high costs of downsizing permanent jobs. 
  At the individual worker level, Kahn (2007) found across several OECD countries in the 
1990s that stricter permanent employment protection led to a higher relative incidence of 
temporary employment among women, youth and immigrants, with larger effects observed in 
countries with higher levels of collective bargaining coverage.  This combination of findings 
suggests that wage floors interact with protection mandates to disproportionately shut out these 
groups from permanent, protected jobs. 
Several authors have estimated the impact of recent reforms in employment protection 
systems in Europe or Latin America, with most analyses focusing on a specific country.  In some 
of these cases, reforms were targeted at subgroups in the labor force, providing researchers with 
a natural experiment in which outcomes can be compared across subgroups.  In each of these 
cases, the reforms were correlated with the expected changes in labor market outcomes, 
suggesting a policy impact.  For example, in the non-targeted reforms (i.e. which applied to all 
employers and workers), transitions from temporary to permanent employment in France fell in 
the 1990s after firing costs from temporary jobs were lowered (Blanchard and Landier 2002); 
and in Italy, temporary employment grew in the late 1990s after passage of reforms making it 
easier to create temporary jobs (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007).  Among the targeted reforms (i.e.   24 
those that applied to a subset of firms or workers), shortening the probationary period (during 
which workers may not sue for unfair dismissal) from two years to one year in the UK was 
associated with a decrease in the firing hazard for workers with up to two years of tenure relative 
to those with more tenure (Marinescu 2007).  Moreover, in Colombia, after reforms reducing 
dismissal costs in the formal sector, labor market turnover into and out of unemployment rose in 
the formal sector relative to the informal sector (Kugler 1999).  And the Spanish reforms of 1997 
lowering dismissal costs for older and younger workers were associated with a relative increase 
in permanent employment for these groups (Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz 2005).  Further, the 
Italian reform of 1990 raising dismissal costs for firms with fewer than 15 workers was 
associated with reduced accessions and separations for these firms relative to larger firms 
(Kugler and Pica 2008).  Finally, Kahn (2010) notes that the most common reform in the 1990s 
in Europe was to make it easier to create temporary jobs.  He found that such reforms led to an 
increase in the incidence of such jobs but no increase in overall employment, suggesting that the 
reforms in effect encouraged the substitution of temporary for permanent jobs. 
While overall the US has the weakest system of employment protection, there is 
variability across states in workers’ rights to sue their firm over dismissals.  Autor, Kerr and 
Kugler (2007) use this variation to study the impact of protection on productivity.  The authors 
find that giving the workers the right to sue over dismissal leads to capital deepening (and 
presumably higher labor productivity) but lower total factor productivity (i.e. productivity given 
the level of labor and capital inputs).  Moreover, MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) find that 
such protection in the US leads to the use of more skill- and training-intensive production 
techniques.  Both studies suggest that protection leads firms to economize on labor costs, but 
Autor, Kerr and Kugler’s (2007) results suggest that less efficient techniques of production are 
used as a result.  Moreover, Autor, Donohue and Schwab’s (2006) finding that these state court 
decisions reduced overall employment is consistent with the idea that that they induce firms to 
economize on labor costs. 
   25 
C.   Parental Leave 
  Parental leave mandates give parents an entitlement to their jobs and also in some cases 
provide pay while one is bearing or rearing children and not at work.  Such mandates have a 
complicated set of potential effects on parents’ labor market outcomes, and these impacts are 
disproportionately felt by women, under a traditional division of labor in the family.  On the one 
hand, having an entitlement to one’s job may raise incentives to return to work after 
childbearing; however, the availability of paid leave or a longer duration of potential leave may 
induce one to stay out of work longer than otherwise.
11  Moreover, the benefits can only be taken 
if one was in a paid job to begin with; therefore the program may induce labor force entry before 
childbearing.  Ruhm (1998) studied the impact of changes in paid parental leave mandates across 
nine European countries over the 1969-93 period.  He found that the entitlement raised women’s 
labor supply but that if paid leave was available for a long duration (e.g. 3 years), then the policy 
lowered their relative wages.  The latter effect may have been due to a loss of women’s human 
capital, the induced entry of less experienced women, or the costs imposed on firms by the 
requirement to keep the worker’s job available (see my earlier discussion of mandated benefits 
and flexible wages).  Thus, the impact of parental leave on women’s employment should vary 
with the degree of wage flexibility, and this would be a fruitful area of further research. 
  While Ruhm (1998) studied nine European countries, Scandinavia is of special interest 
because it has the most generous parental leave and most extensive public child care availability 
among OECD countries.
12  Datta Gupta, Smith and Verner (2008) review studies of these 
countries’ policies and conclude that while they help explain Scandinavian women’s relatively 
high labor force participation rates (see Table 4 above), they also hinder women’s relative wages 
and occupational progression.  Parental leave entitlement may lead to statistical discrimination 
                                                            
11  Indeed, studies of the impact of lengthening the available time of mandated parental or maternity leave in 
Canada, Germany, and the US all find that such expansions increase the amount of time that mothers stay out of the 
paid labor force following childbirth.  See Ondrich, Spiess, Yang and Wagner (2003), Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel 
(2007), and Baker and Milligan (2008).  
12  Of course, four of Ruhm’s (1998) countries were Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), in 
addition to the others in his sample (Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and UK).   26 
by firms to the extent that women disproportionately take the benefit.  These findings are 
consistent with Ruhm (1998) employment and wage results.   
   
D.  Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
 
All countries have policies to improve the labor market outcomes of the unemployed.  
These typically take the form of training, job search assistance or subsidized private or public 
employment.  While there have been hundreds of studies evaluating such programs, Card, Kluve 
and Weber (2009) provide an excellent summary of 97 such studies which have appeared since 
1996.  Twenty six countries are represented in the authors’ survey, and roughly 4/5 of the 
estimates come from programs designed to improve the earnings and employment of 
unemployed workers.  Job search assistance programs are found to have relatively positive 
effects in the short run, with classroom and on-the-job training programs having more positive 
medium term effects.  Notably, subsidized public employment schemes have the least favorable 
effects.  As the authors acknowledge, these estimates do not take into possible displacement 
effects of program participation:  it is possible that a program finds someone a job at the expense 
of a non-participant.  Forslund and Krueger (1997), for example, find evidence of such 
displacement effects in the Swedish context.  And Algan, et al. (2002) find that public 
employment has adverse effects on the private sector economy.  On the other hand, as noted 
earlier, public employment has been credited by some with helping to cushion the loss of jobs 
caused by high wage floors, a conclusion that appears to contradict Card, Kluve and Weber’s 
(2009) survey of ALMPs.  It is possible that the government serves as an employer of last resort 
even if such employment is not part of a formal ALMP, and even if as Algan, et al. (2002) find, 
private sector employment is indirectly hurt, the overall differential in employment between 
skilled and unskilled workers may be lower as a result.   
  UI programs provide benefits to qualifying unemployed workers.  A robust finding across 
countries is that more generous UI benefits and longer potential duration of benefits at least   27 
modestly increase unemployment duration in the US, the UK and Germany, with larger effects in 
Sweden (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Hunt 1995; Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu 2001).  If 
this increased unemployment duration were used in productive search, it might lead to a more 
efficient allocation of labor resources in the economy.  Unfortunately, there is little evidence that 
more generous UI benefits improve post-unemployment earnings (Ehrenberg and Smith 2006, p. 
530).  Perhaps because of such findings, states in the US and countries such as Denmark have 
experimented with their UI systems to encourage better matches with future employers.  In the 
US, a series of experiments largely in the 1980s offering job-seeking services to a control group 
of UI recipients led to better matches, although in one experiment in 1994, such a treatment did 
not affect employment or earnings (Meyer 1995; Klepinger, Johnson and Joesch 2002).  In 
Denmark, increased job search requirements have been credited with helping to lower that 
country’s unemployment rate to the modest levels shown in Tables 4 and 5 above (Anderson and 
Svarer 2007).  But such reforms of UI systems suggest the possibility that one could provide 
income security and perhaps improve the efficiency of the labor market at the same time. 
  Even if UI does lead to longer unemployment duration without better post-unemployment 
matches, the benefits of the insurance could outweigh such costs.  Gruber (1997) in fact provides 
such an analysis of the United States UI system by comparing its effects on consumption-
smoothing among the unemployed with its effects on unemployment duration.  Using 
conventional measures of workers’ risk aversion, one can place a value on the reduction in 
consumption variability that UI enables and compare this value with the lost production due to 
longer unemployment duration.  Gruber (1997) finds under some reasonable assumptions that UI 
replacement rates of 40-50% could optimally balance out insurance and lost production effects, 
although the optimal replacement rate is sensitive to assumptions about risk aversion and the 
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the replacement rate.   
 
VI.  Conclusions 
   28 
  In this paper, I have reviewed theories and evidence on wage-setting institutions and 
labor market policies in an international comparative context.  Many of these policies in effect 
provide income insurance by:  i) reducing the impact of market forces on wages (both over time 
and across workers); ii) mandating severance pay or enacting barriers against firing workers; iii)  
paying unemployment benefits; iv) providing training or public employment to the unemployed 
through ALMPs.  Since it is unlikely that an unregulated private sector would provide such 
insurance, these policies may enhance economic efficiency.  Of course, to the extent that 
unemployment or a misallocation is a result of such measures, these efficiency gains may be 
offset.  Overall, Scandinavia and Central Europe follow distinctively more interventionist 
policies than the English speaking countries in the Northern Hemisphere.  Possible explanations 
for such differences were discussed, including vulnerability to external market forces and ethnic 
homogeneity.   
I then reviewed evidence on the impacts of these policies and institutions.  While the 
interventionist model appears to cause low levels of wage inequality and high levels of job 
security to incumbent workers, it also in some cases leads to the relegation of new entrants 
(disproportionately women, youth and immigrants) as well as the less skilled to temporary jobs 
or unemployment.  Making labor markets more flexible, then, could bring these groups into the 
regular labor market to a greater extent, at the expense of higher levels of economic insecurity 
for incumbents and higher levels of wage inequality.  The Danish model of loosening 
employment protections while providing relatively generous UI benefits with strict job search 
requirements holds out the possibility of reducing barriers for new entrants and the less skilled 
while maintaining some level of income insurance.  Whether such policies could be enacted in 
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